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Abstract 
The time at which a rational patient might choose an elective medical procedure for a non-life-
threatening ailment is contemplated.  The resulting model is purposely uncomplicated but gen-
eral, and accounts for several basic factors that might affect such a decision.  One such factor is 
that a patient cannot know with certainty the degree to which the medical procedure will be suc-
cessful.  Even so, patients have information about the expected outcome of the procedure and its 
risk, and about how the expected outcome and risk are affected by medical technological pro-
gress and surgeon experience.  The effect of changes in exogenous variables on the timing of the 
medical procedure and on patient welfare are investigated.  It is shown that risk averse and pru-
dent patients behave in an unambiguous manner in response to changes in all of the exogenous 
variables. 
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1.  Introduction 
Mr. Jones suffered an injury to his knee more than one half-century ago while parachute training 
in the U.S. Army.  His knee was repaired to the extent possible at the time.  Years later Mr. Jones 
visited a Veterans Affairs physician to complain about the condition of his knee, as it was caus-
ing him considerable discomfort during routine activities.  The physician informed him that his 
knee was in a continuous state of decline, and that short of total knee replacement, there was 
nothing either of them could do about the condition of his knee.  In addition, the physician stated 
that the decision to undergo total knee replacement was entirely up to Mr. Jones, as he was in the 
best position—not the physician—to judge how his quality of life was being affected by the de-
clining condition of his knee.  Mr. Jones was also informed that the outcome of the surgery is 
expected to be better, and the risk associated with it lower, the longer he waited to undergo sur-
gery, due to advancements in medical technology and accumulation of surgeon experience.  For 
these reasons Mr. Jones waited more than a decade after the aforesaid visit before electing to un-
dergo total knee replacement.  As put by Bayliss et al. (2017, p. 1430), “Patients who are consid-
ering undergoing joint replacement should balance the potential benefits of an improvement in 
their quality of life against the potential risks of the intervention: death, medical complications, 
infection, poor functional outcome, and the need for revision surgery.  Patients have indicated 
that they require improved information about these outcomes, particularly in relation to deciding 
on the correct time to have surgery.” 
 Versions of this story are commonplace.   According to Williams et al. (2015, p. 5), total 
knee replacement was among the five most frequent inpatient surgeries from 2000–2010 in the 
U.S., and it was the most frequent in 2008, 2009, and 2010, with nearly 700,000 total knee re-
placements performed among inpatients aged 45 and over in 2010.  Similarly, Wolford et al. 
(2015, p. 1) reported that approximately 326,000 total hip replacements were performed in the 
U.S. in 2010, while Sloan et al. (2018, p. 1458) forecasted that there will be 635,000 to 909,900 
total hip replacements and 1.26 to 1.68 million total knee replacements by 2030 in the U.S.  
What is more, these estimates understate the number of total joint replacements, seeing as they 
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do not include ankle, elbow, and shoulder replacements, nor do they account for partial joint re-
placements. 
 Labek et al. (2011) have documented that the revision rates are positive but small for all 
joint replacements—the revision rate for total hip replacement is 6.45% after five years and 
12.9% after 10, with slightly lower percentages for total knee replacement.  They also document-
ed considerable variation in revision rates across countries for the same type of joint replace-
ment.  In other words, joint replacement surgery entails at least some risk, seeing as an exoge-
nous, uniform, non-stochastic rate of depreciation cannot fully rationalize the above.  According-
ly, surgical risk plays a fundamental role in the proposed model of patient decision making.  
Moreover, Stavrakis and SooHoo (2016, p. 1453) argued “ … that total ankle replacement would 
demonstrate increasing utilization and lower complication rates given advances in implant design 
and growth in surgeon experience.”  Indeed, over time, surgical outcomes have generally im-
proved and the risks associated with them have declined because medical technologies and sur-
geons have improved too.  These facts are taken into account in the model as well. 
 Another condition that exhibits the above flavor is cataract, whose numbers are consider-
able.  According to Lindstrom (2015, p. 62), cataract surgery is the most common procedure per-
formed by an ophthalmic surgeon, with an estimated 3.6 million cataract procedures performed 
in the U.S. in 2015 and more than 20 million performed worldwide.  The intraocular lens used in 
cataract surgery is permanent and will never cloud, and unlike an artificial joint, there are no 
moving parts in the lens that could wear out over time.  Hence revisions are rare, but if they do 
occur they are the result of less-than-perfect, i.e., risky, surgeries. 
 In order to more generally frame the contribution herein, consider a patient who is diag-
nosed with a non-life-threatening condition or ailment.  The condition is known to worsen over 
time and there is little that can be done about it either by the medical community or the patient, 
other than for the patient to elect a medical procedure.  The medical expertise and technology ex-
ists to correct the ailment and is known to yield better expected outcomes with less variability the 
longer the patient waits to undergo the procedure.  The decision to undergo the procedure is en-
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tirely up to the patient, not the physician, as the patient is in the best position to determine the 
degree to which the ailment is affecting their quality of life.  The procedure is fully covered by 
insurance, so out-of-pocket expenses are sufficiently small and fixed.  When does a rational pa-
tient elect to undergo the medical procedure to correct a non-life-threatening ailment?  This deci-
sion problem is formally modeled and its qualitative and welfare properties are studied. 
 The resulting model is purposely uncomplicated but uses general specifications for the 
primitive functions.  As a result, the refutable implications derived from it are robust and do not 
rely on the specification of functional forms that are chosen because, say, they provide a closed-
form solution.  The main finding is that the time at which an elective medical procedure is cho-
sen by a risk averse and prudent patient, and the welfare of said patient, respond to changes in 
the exogenous variables in an entirely predictable fashion.  Accordingly, the refutable implica-
tions form the basis for a statistical test of the rationality of patients faced with decisions of this 
nature. 
 There is a small literature related to, but decidedly different from, the present work, most 
notably that by Whynes (1995), Driffield and Smith (2007), and Meyer and Rees (2012).  All 
three model a condition that involves “watchful waiting.”  According to Whynes (1995, p. 478), 
“Watchful waiting refers to the provision of routine, supervisory care within a monitoring regime 
which will alert the practitioner to any change in the patient’s condition.”  It may be prescribed 
for slow growing cancers such lymphoma or prostate cancer, or for diseases that progress slowly.  
Watchful waiting is also a recommended treatment option for benign prostatic hyperplasia, in-
guinal hernia, abdominal aortic aneurysm, and mild chronic hepatitis C, and is also a recom-
mended treatment for conditions that have the potential to resolve themselves due to the body’s 
curative capacity, such as the common cold, ear infections, and mild forms of depression.  This 
stands in contrast to the class of ailments contemplated here, which are not life-threatening, do 
not resolve themselves on their own, and for which only a medical procedure can halt their pro-
gression.  Moreover, the monitoring and testing that goes along with watchful waiting is used to 
inform the physician—the decision maker in such instances—as to when surgery or more ag-
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gressive medical intervention is required.  In contrast, for the class of ailments contemplated 
herein, the patient knows fully well how the progression of the ailment is affecting their quality 
of life.  Hence the patient is in the best position to make the decision as to when to elect a medi-
cal procedure, not the physician. 
 The salient and distinguishing features of the proposed model are that (i) it includes grad-
ual improvements in medical technologies and accumulation of surgical experience, (ii) the ail-
ment is not life threatening, (iii) the medical procedure is elective, (v) the decision to elect the 
procedure is that of the patient, not the physician, and (v) the medical procedure is risky.  In con-
trast, Whynes (1995) employed a watchful waiting framework and contemplated a physician-
made decision to minimize total expected treatment costs for a given population by choosing the 
optimal time to switch from a treatment that involves a strictly positive risk of relapse, to a 
treatment that entails a definite cure.  Meyer and Rees (2012) considered the optimal timing of a 
patient undergoing a medical treatment as an optimal stopping problem when the state of health 
of a patient evolves stochastically.  The decision maker in their framework is not the patient, as it 
is here, but rather an omniscient regulator who knows a patient’s preferences, observes the pa-
tient’s state of health at every point in time, and knows the stochastic process governing the evo-
lution of the patient’s state of health.  Driffield and Smith (2007) were the first to employ a real-
options approach to the optimal timing of a medical treatment.  Their model is essentially a spe-
cial case of that considered by Meyer and Rees (2012). 
2.  The Model and Assumptions 
At time  a patient visits a physician with a health complaint.  The physician informs the pa-
tient that they have an ailment or condition that defines the patient’s initial state of health, say 
.  Although the ailment is not life threatening, it grows worse over time unless 
the patient elects a medical procedure, as there is nothing the physician or patient can do about it 
otherwise.  Consequently, before electing a medical procedure a patient’s health is governed by 
the differential equation , where the depreciation function  determines 
the rate at which the ailment worsens over time and  is a shift parameter.  It therefore 
t = 0
 H (0) = H0 ∈! ++
 
!H1(t) = −δ (t;q) < 0 δ (⋅)
 q∈! ++
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follows that  for all .  It is important to note that health is de-
fined narrowly, as it is a reference to the state of a particular ailment.  Observe too that the de-
preciation function  cannot be influenced by a patient, i.e., a patient cannot influence the 
pace at which their health declines prior to the medical procedure, which is largely the case for 
candidates facing cataracts surgery and those contemplating joint replacement.  In effect, this 
feature of the model defines the types of ailments under consideration. 
 Let  be the time at which a patient elects to undergo a medical procedure, which 
is completed instantaneously seeing as time is continuous, and let  be the known time at 
which a patient dies.  A patient’s state of health post-procedure, say , , does not 
change over the remainder of their life, hence  for all —adding exoge-
nous depreciation does not change any of the results.  However, the outcome of the medical pro-
cedure is not known with certainty, and therefore a patient’s post-procedure state of health is 
, where  is a random variable.  Because the focus is on studying the effects of 
changes in exogenous variables on the time at which a patient elects the medical procedure and a 
patient’s welfare, it is useful to parameterize the random variable in a simple manner that permits 
those goals to be achieved, to wit, , where  and  
are shift parameters and  is a random variable whose probability density function has domain 
, with .  The random variable  satisfies  and , which imply 
that  and . 
 Instantaneous preferences are represented by  before the medical procedure, 
i.e., for , and  after the procedure, that is, for .  A patient’s inter-
temporal rate of time preference is . 
 Pulling all of the preceding together, the decision problem can be stated as 
  , (1) 
where  and  is the maximum expected present discounted value of 
lifetime utility given the parameter vector .  The ensuing five assumptions are placed on the 
H1(t) = H0 − δ (s;q)ds0
t
∫ t ∈[0,τ )
δ (⋅)
τ ∈[0,T ]
 T ∈! ++
H2 (t) t ∈[τ ,T ]
H2 (t) = H2 (τ ) t ∈[τ ,T ]
 H2 (τ ) = !H  !H
 H2 (τ ) = !H = µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε  m∈! ++  v∈! ++
 !ε
[ε ,ε ] ε < 0 < ε  !ε  Ε[ !ε ]= 0  Ε[ !ε 2 ]= 1
 Ε[ !H ]= µ(τ ;m)∈" ++  Ε [
!H − µ(τ ;m)]2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =σ (τ ,v)2 ∈" ++
U H1(t)( )
t ∈[0,τ ) U H2 (τ )( ) t ∈[τ ,T ]
 ρ ∈! ++
 
V (β) =def max
τ
Ε U H0 − δ (s;q)ds0
t
∫( )e−ρt dt
0
τ
∫ + U µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε( )e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
β =def (H0,m,q,v,ρ,T ) V (β)
β
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primitives of problem (1) and discussed subsequently.  Two additional assumptions are relegated 
to the Appendix and discussed there so as to not break the flow with technical matters. 
(A1) , ,  and  for all . 
(A2) ,  and  for all . 
(A3) , , , , , 
, and  for all . 
(A4) , , , , , and 
 for all . 
(A5)  for all . 
 Assumption (A1) places prototypical restrictions on the function  that represents in-
stantaneous preferences, to wit, that (i) it is twice continuously differentiable, (ii) health is a 
good, and (iii) the patient is risk averse.  Similarly, supposition (A2) asserts that the ailment de-
preciation function is once continuously differentiable and that an increase in its parameter in-
creases the rate at which an ailment worsens over time. 
 Assumptions (A3), (A4), and (A5) specify the effects of medical technology progress and 
accumulation of medical experience on the expected state of health resulting from, and risk of, 
the medical procedure.  Leaving the technical part of assumption (A3) aside, it asserts that the 
expected state of health after the medical procedure is higher than a patient’s initial state of 
health but less than a perfect state of health .  It also stipulates that the expected state of 
health increases at a deceasing rate over time.  Furthermore, an increase in the parameter  in-
creases the expected state of health at every point in time without affecting its slope, an assump-
tion fully akin to a parallel shift in a demand curve. 
 Supposition (A4) places analogous stipulations on the standard deviation of a patient’s 
state of health after the medical procedure.  In particular, it supposes that the standard deviation 
decreases over time at a decreasing rate, and that an increase in the parameter  decreases the 
standard deviation at each point in time without affecting its slope.  Note that while the riskiness 
of the medical procedure declines over time, it is never eliminated. 
 U(⋅) :! + → ! + U(⋅)∈C
(2) ′U (H ) > 0 ′′U (H ) < 0  H ∈! ++
 δ (⋅) :! + ×! ++ → ! ++ δ (⋅)∈C
(1) δ q (t;q) > 0  (t,q)∈! ++ ×! ++
 µ(⋅) :! + ×! ++ → ! ++ µ(⋅)∈C
(2)
 H0 < µ(τ ;m) < H
∗ ∈! ++ µτ (τ ;m) > 0 µττ (τ ;m) < 0
µm (τ ;m) > 0 µτm (τ ;m) ≡ 0  (τ ,m)∈(0,T )×! ++
 σ (⋅) :! + ×! ++ → ! ++ σ (⋅)∈C
(2) στ (τ ;v) < 0 σττ (τ ;v) > 0 σ v(τ ;v) < 0
στv(τ ;v) ≡ 0  (τ ,v)∈(0,T )×! ++
µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v)ε < H0 < µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v)ε ≤ H ∗  (τ ,m,v)∈(0,T )×! ++ ×! ++
U(⋅)
H ∗
m
v
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 Finally, assumption (A5) is required to fully capture the risk associated with any medical 
procedure, in that the worst outcome of the procedure results in a state of health below the initial 
state, i.e., the surgery can go tragically wrong.  It also stipulates that the best outcome of the 
medical procedure can result in no more than perfect health.  This rules out the implausible out-
come in which a cataract patient who undergoes surgery has the eyes of an eagle. 
 Under the two additional assumptions stated and discussed in the Appendix, it is deduced 
in the Appendix that  is the locally unique and  solution to problem (1).  Thus the 
maximum expected present discounted value of lifetime utility  may be defined as 
 , (2) 
and is at least a locally  function in light of the foregoing deductions.  Note that the first term 
on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is the discounted lifetime utility of a patient up until the chosen 
time of the medical procedure , while the second is the expected discounted lifetime 
utility from that point in time until death. 
 As deduced in the Appendix,  satisfies the first-order necessary condition of 
problem (1), found by applying Leibniz’s rule and the chain rule to it, to wit, 
  (3) 
To get at the economic interpretation of Eq. (3), observe that it may be written in a more compact 
form using  and  to arrive at 
  . (4) 
The left-hand side of Eq. (4) is the expected present value of the marginal benefit of delaying the 
medical procedure.  It is comprised of the (certain) present value of the utility gained from the 
pre- procedure state of health due to delaying the procedure, plus the expected present discount-
ed value of the marginal utility over a patient’s post-procedure lifetime resulting from the delay.  
τ = τ ∗(β) C (1)
V (β)
 
V (β) =def U H0 − δ (s;q)ds0
t
∫( )e−ρt dt
0
τ ∗ (β )
∫ +Ε U µ τ ∗(β);m( ) +σ τ ∗(β);v( ) !ε( )e−ρt dt
τ ∗ (β )
T
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
C (1)
τ = τ ∗(β)
τ = τ ∗(β)
 
e−ρτU H0 − δ (s;q)ds0
τ
∫( )− e−ρτΕ U µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
+Ε ′U µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε( ) µτ (τ ;m)+στ (τ ;v) !ε[ ]e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ = 0.
H1(t) = H0 − δ (s;q)ds0
t
∫  H2 (τ ) = µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε
 
e−ρτU H1(τ )( ) +Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) µτ (τ ;m)+στ (τ ;v) !ε[ ]e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ = e−ρτΕ U H2 (τ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
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The right-hand side of Eq. (4) is the expected present value of the marginal cost of delaying the 
medical procedure.  It consists of the present value of expected utility lost in the post-procedure 
state of health from delaying the medical procedure.  With the above matters addressed, attention 
is turned to an examination of the qualitative properties of problem (1). 
3.  Qualitative Results 
To begin, note that Eq. (3) is more useful than Eq. (4) for the purpose of comparative statics, as 
all of the parameters are explicitly indicated in it.  To derive the comparative statics, substitute 
 in Eq. (3) to create an identity in the parameter vector , and then differentiate the 
identity with respect to the parameter of interest using Leibniz’s rule and the chain rule.  This is 
the approach followed to derive the ensuing comparative statics expressions.  Furthermore, note 
that all such ensuing expressions are evaluated at , and that  by assumption (A7), 
where  is defined in the Appendix. 
The Initial State of Health 
The effect of an improvement in a patient’s initial state of health  is given by 
 . (5) 
As health is a good, an increase in a patient’s initial state of health, that is, a report from the phy-
sician that the ailment is not as bad as the patient might have imagined, results in the patient 
electing to undergo the medical procedure at a later date.  Furthermore, a patient is better off be-
cause of the more favorable initial diagnosis.  To see this, use Eq. (2) and the envelope theorem 
to arrive at 
 , (6) 
the sign of which also follows from the assumption that health is a good. 
The Expected State of Health Resulting From the Medical Procedure 
The effect of an increase in the expected state of health resulting from the medical procedure, 
that is, an increase in the parameter , is given by 
τ = τ ∗(β) β
τ = τ ∗(β) D < 0
D
H0
∂τ ∗(β)
∂H0
≡
−e−ρτ ′U H1(τ )( )
D > 0
∂V (β)
∂H0
= ′U H1(t)( )e−ρt dt
0
τ ∗ (β )
∫ > 0
m
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  (7) 
 . (8) 
Equation (8) shows that a patient is better off if the expected state of health resulting from the 
medical procedure increases, whereas Eq. (7) shows that the sign of  cannot be une-
quivocally determined under the given assumptions.  The difficulty is that there are three effects 
present in the comparative statics.  The first effect in Eq. (7) leads to an earlier medical proce-
dure, as it reflects the increased cost of delay due to the better expected state of health that sub-
sequently results.  The second leads to an earlier medical procedure too.  It arises because with 
an increase in the expected state of health there is also an additional cost to waiting that a risk 
averse patient prefers to avoid.  Therefore, each of the first two effects result in the patient elect-
ing the medical procedure sooner.  The third effect, on the other hand, is in general ambiguous, 
in as much as the sign of  is not known under the 
given assumptions.  That said, three additional subcases are worth mentioning. 
 For the first subcase, take the simplest instance in which a patient has risk neutral prefer-
ences, i.e., .  Under this stipulation only the first effect mentioned above remains, 
hence the patient elects the medical procedure sooner when the expected state of health from the 
procedure increases.  A slightly more general subcase occurs if a risk averse patient had prefer-
ences that were representable by a quadratic utility function, that is, if  is a constant.  
In this instance the first two of the above-mentioned effects remain but the ambiguous third ef-
fect vanishes, again leading to the conclusion that . 
 For the third more general subcase, assume that a patient is prudent, i.e., assume that 
 and .  Now observe that if there were an increase in the realizations of , 
 
∂τ ∗(β)
∂m ≡
e−ρτµm (τ ;m)Ε ′U H2 (τ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
D +
−µτ (τ ;m)µm (τ ;m)Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D
+
−µm (τ ;m)στ (τ ;v)Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D ,
∂V (β)
∂m = Ε ′U H2 τ
∗(β)( )( )µm τ ∗(β);m( )e−ρt dt
τ ∗ (β )
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
> 0
∂τ ∗(β) ∂m
 Ε ′′U H2 (τ );a( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′′U H2 (τ );a( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
′′U (H ) ≡ 0
′′U (H ) < 0
∂τ ∗(β) ∂m < 0
U(⋅)∈C (3) ′′′U (H ) > 0  !ε
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the realizations of  would increase too.  And under the assumption of 
prudence, this would in turn increase the realizations of , from which it follows that 
.  Consequently, the third effect mentioned above is 
negative as well under prudence.  Thus, under the additional stipulation that the patient is pru-
dent,  and is larger in magnitude than either of the two previous subcases.  More-
over, seeing as diminishing absolute risk aversion implies prudence, it follows that agents whose 
preferences exhibit diminishing absolute risk aversion elect the medical procedure sooner when 
the expected state of health that results from it improves. 
The Depreciation of Health Prior to the Medical Procedure 
The effect of an increase in the rate of depreciation prior to the medical procedure, i.e., an in-
crease in the parameter , is given by 
 , (9) 
 . (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) show that a patient elects to have the medical procedure sooner and is 
worse off if their health declines at a faster rate in the pre-procedure period.  This is intuitive, 
seeing as if health declines at a faster rate before the medical procedure, then the expected bene-
fit of an earlier surgery is higher and it can be enjoyed for a longer period of time. 
The Riskiness of the Medical Procedure 
The effect of a reduction in the risk associated with the medical procedure, that is, an increase in 
the parameter , is given by 
  (11) 
 H2 (τ ) = µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε
′′U H2 (τ )( )
 Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0
∂τ ∗(β) ∂m < 0
q
∂τ ∗(β)
∂q ≡
e−ρτ ′U H1(τ )( ) δ q (s;q)ds0
τ
∫⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
D < 0
∂V (β)
∂q = − ′U H1(t)( ) δ q (s;q)ds0
t
∫⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
e−ρt dt
0
τ ∗ (β )
∫ < 0
v
 
∂τ ∗(β)
∂v ≡
e−ρτσ v(τ ;v)Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
D +
−στ (τ ;v)σ v(τ ;v)Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε 2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D
+
−µτ (τ ;m)σ v(τ ;v)Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D ,
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 . (12) 
Equation (12) shows that a patient is better off when the variance of the medical procedure de-
creases.  To see this, first note that .  Consequently, if it 
can be shown that , then  follows.  If it were the case that 
the realizations of  increased, then so too would the realizations of .  
But because of diminishing marginal utility, the realizations of  would decrease, 
thereby establishing that , and therefore that , as claimed. 
 In contrast, the sign of  cannot be determined in general because the sign of the 
third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is ambiguous under the given assumptions.  The first 
term, however, is negative seeing as , as demonstrated above.  It reflects 
the direct reduction in the risk associated with the medical procedure by a risk averse patient.  
The second term is negative as well, in view of the fact that , and cap-
tures the increased benefit from the reduction in risk over the post-procedure period.  Under the 
additional stipulation that the patient is prudent, , as 
previously demonstrated.  As a result, a risk-averse and prudent patient will elect to undergo the 
medical procedure sooner if the risk associated with the medical procedure decreases.  What is 
more, the same is true if a patient’s preferences (i) were risk neutral, (ii) could be represented by 
a quadratic utility function, or (iii) exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
Time Preferences 
Now consider an increase in the intertemporal rate of discount , that is, 
, (13) 
 , (14) 
 
∂V (β)
∂v =σ v τ
∗(β);v( )Ε ′U H2 τ ∗(β)( )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ e−ρt dt
τ ∗ (β )
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
> 0
 Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
 Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0 ∂V (β) ∂v > 0
 !ε  H2 (τ ) = µ(τ ;m)+σ (τ ;v) !ε
′U H2 (τ )( )
 Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0 ∂V (β) ∂v > 0
∂τ ∗(β) ∂v
 Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0
 
Ε ′′U H2 (τ );a( ) !ε 2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0
 Ε ′′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0
ρ
 
∂τ ∗(β)
∂ρ
≡
µτ (τ ;m)Ε ′U H2 (τ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ [t −τ ]e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D +
στ (τ ;v)Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ [t −τ ]e−ρt dt
τ
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
D < 0
∂V (β)
∂ρ
= − tU H1(t )( )e−ρt dt
0
τ ∗ (β )
∫ − Ε tU H2 τ ∗(β)( )( )e−ρt dt
τ ∗ (β )
T
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
< 0
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where it should be noted that Eq. (4) was used to rewrite the numerator of Eq. (13).  As demon-
strated above, , hence a increase in the intertemporal 
rate of time preference makes a patient worse off and causes the medical procedure to be elected 
sooner. 
Length of Life 
Finally, consider an increase in the lifetime of a patient , that is, 
 , (15) 
 . (16) 
Again recalling that , an increase in the lifetime of a 
patient makes the patient better off and results in a delay of the medical procedure.  The latter re-
flects the fact that by delaying the procedure, its expected outcome is improved and its riskiness 
is reduced, both of which are now captured over a longer period of time. 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
A model describing the time at which a patient will choose to undergo an elective medical pro-
cedure in order to address a worsening but non-life-threatening ailment was developed and ana-
lyzed for its refutable qualitative properties.  It was purposely simple yet employed general func-
tions, thereby making the refutable implications drawn from it robust, and importantly, not con-
ditioned on ad hoc functional form assumptions.  For a risk averse and prudent patient, the time 
at which an elective medical procedure is chosen, and the welfare of said patient, respond to 
changes in the exogenous variables in a wholly predictable fashion.  Accordingly, the refutable 
implications form the basis for a statistical test of the rationality of patients faced with decisions 
of this ilk. 
5.  Appendix 
In addition to assumptions (A1)–(A5), the following two suppositions are made: 
 Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0
T
 
∂τ ∗(β)
∂T ≡
−e−ρTµτ (τ ;m)E ′U H2 (τ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
D +
−e−ρTστ (τ ;v)E ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
D > 0
∂V (β)
∂T = Ε U H2 τ
∗(β)( )( )e−ρT⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0
 Ε ′U H2 (τ )( ) !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cov ′U H2 (τ )( ), !ε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0
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(A6) There exists an interior solution to the first-order necessary condition of problem (1) 
when , denoted by . 
(A7) The second-order sufficient condition for problem (1) holds at . 
Assumption (A6) is employed because so little structure is placed on the four primitive functions 
.  In conjunction with supposition (A7), a well-known local sufficiency theo-
rem is satisfied and thus may be invoked to conclude that the value  is the unique local 
solution to problem (1).  What is more, the conditions of the implicit function theorem are met 
under assumptions (A6) and (A7).  Consequently, it follows from the implicit function theorem 
that the first-order necessary condition given in Eq. (3) may, in principle, be solved for  as a 
locally  function of  in an open neighborhood of the point , yielding, say, 
.  Thus a differential comparative statics analysis of problem (1) may be carried out. 
 The second-order sufficient condition is given by 
  (17) 
and is satisfied at .  Observe that the second-order sufficient condition neither implies, 
nor is implied by, diminishing marginal utility of health.  This is unusual, as the assumption of 
diminishing marginal utility typically implies that the second-order sufficient condition holds in 
an expected utility maximization problem.  Even so, the added stipulation of diminishing mar-
ginal utility has value in deriving refutable comparative statics, as seen in §3. 
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